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Forschung, Veranstaltungen, Publikationen

Corruption in Eastern/Southeastern Europe and Latin America: Comparative Perspectives

Fifth Annual Conference of the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies
29 June – 1 July 2017, IOS Regensburg.
Flyer
Plakat
Anmeldung zur Eröffnungsveranstaltung

Seminarreihe des Arbeitsbereichs Ökonomie am IOS

Zeit: Dienstag, 13.30–15.00 Uhr
Ort: WiOS, Landshuter Str. 4 (Raum 109)
Programm Sommer 2017

Forschungskolloquium: „Geschichte und Sozialanthropologie Südost‐ und Osteuropas“

Zeit: Donnerstag, 14–16 Uhr
Ort: WiOS, Landshuter Str. 4 (Raum 017)
Programm Sommersemester 2017

1st Corridors Young Researchers Workshop

Obstacles and Opportunities for Dialogue and Cooperation in Protracted Conflicts.
September 3 – 9, 2017, Regenstauf (Germany)
Call for Participants.
The application deadline is June 30.

Doppeltagung (Regensburg, Marburg):

Bilder und Sprachen von Not, Gewalt und Mobilisierung. Das östliche Europa nach 1918 in medialen Repräsentationen

Call for papers

1. Tagung: Der Nachkrieg
IOS Regensburg 12.–13. April 2018

Eine ausführliche Beschreibung der Tagung und des CfP finden Sie hier.
Bitte bewerben Sie sich über dieses Onlineportal.
Deadline für Referatsvorschläge: 31. Juli 2017

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Gastwiss. Programm Text
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13. März 2017
Publications

IOS Working Papers No. 364 ist erschienen

Sticks or Carrots? Comparing Effectiveness of Government Shadow Economy Policies in Russia, IOS Working Papers 364, March 2017

Which incentives have the strongest impact on the size of the shadow economy? Is it about government’s pressure against entrepreneurs operating in this sector, or is it about the benefits of legality? The goal of this paper is to explicitly contrast the role of sticks (court repressiveness) and carrots (financial aid to small and medium-sized firms) as factors determining the size of the shadow economy, using the case of the Russian taxi market. It uses a unique dataset of taxi licensing data from regional transport departments and indicators for taxi market demand to estimate the extent of informal business. When controlling for market demand, it finds a strong and robust positive effect of sanctions on the size of the official market, with higher repressiveness leading to a smaller shadow economy. In contrast, the effect of carrots was insignificant. The results suggest that the effectiveness of carrot policies is compromised when entrepreneurs operate informally to avoid dealing with corrupt bureaucrats and have low trust in the government.