European Rust Belts. West-East Comparisons – and Beyond
International Conference, Regensburg, 7-8 May 2020
Call for Papers
Deadline for submissions: 15 August 2019
Self-Selection Into Public Service When Corruption is Widespread: Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia
Ein Vortrag von Dmitriy Vorobyev (Ural Federal University and CERGE-EI Prague) im Rahmen der Seminarreihe des AB Ökonomie am IOS.
Datum: 7. Mai 2019
Zeit: 13.30 Uhr
Ort: Leibniz-Institut für Ost-und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS), Landshuter Str. 4 (Raum 109)
Drawing on experimental games and surveys conducted with students at two universities in Russia, we compare the behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic traits of students seeking public sector employment to the traits of their peers seeking jobs in the private sector. Contrary to similar studies conducted in other high-corruption contexts, such as India, we find evidence that students who prefer a public sector career display less willingness to cheat or bribe in experimental games as well as higher levels of altruism. One interpretation of these findings is that corruption in Russia results from the transformation of bureaucrats’ behavior and attitudes after entering the civil service, rather than through a process of corrupt self-selection. Another interpretation is that despite widespread corruption, state employment in Russia genuinely attracts at least some of the younger generation for idealistic reasons beyond personal enrichment or job security. Implications of these and other interpretations for the creation of effective anti-corruption policies and for understanding of state capacity in contexts where corruption is widespread are discussed.